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Proving Entrapment Under the
Predisposition Test*
Paul Marcus**
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court and a majority of the states 1
have chosen to focus attention in the entrapment area on the individual: his state of mind, his actions, and his relationship with government officers. This majority view rejects the objective rule sometimes
applied in entrapment cases and favors a subjective test. 2 The sense
has been that the entrapment test is not based on a particular constitutional principle or a particular construction of the substantive criminal
law. Yet, the subjective test was developed in response to a concern

about the legislative intent of Congress in adopting its substantive
criminal code sections: Congress could not have intended an innocent
individual to be found guilty of a crime when a government agent improperly induced that person into committing the criminal act. The
United States Supreme Court has made this point repeatedly in numerous decisions. The following excerpts are illustrative:
Literal interpretation of statutes at the expense of the reason
of the law and producing absurd consequences or flagrant
injustice has frequently been condemned.
We think that this established principle of construction
is applicable here. We are unable to conclude that it was the
intention of the Congress in enacting this statute that its
processes of detection and enforcement should be abused by
the instigation by government officials of an act on the part

* Paul Marcus, 1987. During the coming year, Dean Marcus will complete THE
ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE (Kluwer & Co.).
** Dean and Professor of Law, University of Arizona.
1. For a good discussion of the state statutes which follow the subjective principle, see
Park, The Emrapment Controversy, 60 MINN. L. REv. 163 (1976).
2. The objective test, of course, focuses its attention almost exclusively on the conduct of
the Government agents; thus, the individual defendant becomes somewhat irrelevant to the determination of whether entrapment existed. For thoughtful discussions of the point, see the opinion of Justice Roberts concurring in the judgment in Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 453
(1932), and the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S.
369, 378 (1958). Both of these cases are discussed at length in Marcus, The Entrapment Defense
and the Procedural Issues, 22 CRIM. L. BULL. 197 (1986).
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of persons otherwise innocent in order to lure them to its
commission and to punish them. . . . [T]he Government in
such a case is estopped to prosecute or the courts should bar
the prosecution. 3;
The case at bar illustrates an evil which the defense of
entrapment is designed to overcome. The government informer entices someone attempting to avoid narcotics not
only into carrying out an illegal sale but also into returning
to the habit of use. Selecting the proper time, the informer
then tells the government agent. The set-up is accepted by
the agent without even a question as to the manner in which
the informer encountered the seller. Thus the Government
plays on the weaknesses of an innocent party and beguiles
him into committing crimes which he otherwise would not
have attempted. Law enforcement does not require methods
such as this. 4 ; and
[E]ntrapment is a relatively limited defense. It is rooted, not
in any authority of the Judicial Branch to dismiss prosecutions for what it feels to have been "overzealous law enforcement," but instead in the notion that Congress could not
have intended criminal punishment for a defendant who has
committed all the elements of a proscribed offense, but was
induced to commit them by the government. 5
Justice Rehnquist also noted in United States v. Hampton :
"[T]he entrapment defense 'focus[es] on the intent or predisposition of
the defendant to commit the crime,' rather than upon the conduct of
the Government's agents." 6
The lower federal courts have also stated that the principal focus
in the entrapment area is on the individual defendant on trial. 7 The
Fifth Circuit recently stated the matter quite clearly: "The entrapment defense focuses on the intent or predisposition of the defendant
to commit the crime rather than on the conduct of the government's
3. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 446-48 (1932) (Hughes, C.J.).
4. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 376 (1958) (Warren, C.J.) (footnote omitted).
5. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973) (Rehnquist, J.).
6. 425 U.S. 484, 488 (1976) (quoting Russell, 411 U.S. at 429).
7. To be distinguished from the attention which would be given, under the objective test,
to government conduct. As stated by Justice Frankfurter in the Sherman case,
It is surely sheer fiction to suggest that a conviction cannot be had when a defend·
ant has been entrapped by government officers or informers because "Congress could
not have intended that its statutes were to be enforced by tempting innocent persons
into violations.... "
The courts refuse to convict an entrapped defendant, not because his conduct falls
outside the proscription of the statute, but because, even if his guilt be admitted, the
methods employed on behalf of the Government to bring about conviction cannot be
countenanced.
356 U.S. at 379, 380.
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agents.... The question of entrapment goes to the basic guilt or innocence of the defendant.'' 8
The Eighth Circuit in United States v. Lard 9 relied on an earlier
opinion of Justice Brandeis when it summarized the subjective test:
The entrapment defense is based on the assumption that
Congress did not intend to punish a defendant who has committed all the elements of a proscribed offense upon the inducement or instigation of government agents. . . . "[T]he
Government may set decoys to entrap criminals. But it may
not provoke or create a crime and then punish the criminal,
its creature.'' 10

II.

THE ELEMENTS OF THE TEsT

Given that the basis for the subjective entrapment defense is the
nature of the relationship that the individual has with the government,
it is not surprising that the actual test used in practice focuses on the
two main elements described below. The Court in Sorrells explained:
"[T]he issues raised and the evidence adduced must be pertinent to the
controlling question whether the defendant is a person otherwise innocent whom the government is seeking to punish for an alleged offense
which is the product of the creative activity of its own officials." 11
A few statutory references also illustrate this two-part analysis.
The Illinois code provides as follows:
A person is not guilty of an offense if his conduct is incited or
induced by a public officer or employee or agent of either, for

the purpose of obtaining evidence for the prosecution of such
person. However, this Section is inapplicable if a public officer or employee, or agent of either, merely affords to such
person the opportunity or facility for committing an offense
in furtherance of a criminal purpose which such person has
originated. 12
The Missouri law is even more specific:
An "entrapment" is perpetuated [sic] if a law enforcement
officer or a person acting in cooperation with such an officer,
8. United States v. Yater, 756 F.2d 1058, 1062 (5th Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 225 (1985). The court went on to explain that the defense had to show that the
government agent created "a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by a person
other than one ready to commit it." /d. at 1062 n.6 (quoting Pierce v. United States, 414 F.2d
163, 168 (5th Cir. 1969)).
9. 734 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1984).
10. 734 F.2d at 1292 (quoting Casey v. United States, 276 U.S. 413, 423 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting)).
11. United States v. Sorrells, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932).
12. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38. para. 7-12 (Smith-Hurd 1972).
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for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the commission of
an offense, solicits, encourages or otherwise induces another
person to engage in conduct when he was not ready and willing to engage in such conduct. 13
It is clear from Supreme Court discussions and various statutory
provisions that under the subjective test for entrapment the two primary issues to be litigated at trial are: 14 (1) evidence of inducement by
government agents; and (2) the state of mind of the defendant. While
recognizing that these two questions are usually at issue in entrapment
cases, the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Hunt 15 concluded that
the predisposition element of the two-part analysis is the more important one. It explained that "the essential element of the entrapment
defense is the defendant's lack of predisposition to commit the crime
charged." 16 The court's conclusion that the predisposition element is
the determinative one may have been correct, but that conclusion
might have been reached somewhat quickly. In many cases a host of
issues involved with inducement must also be considered. These issues
include: (1) the impropriety of inducement as a matter of law; (2) the
mechanics of proving inducement; (3) the nature of the burden of
proof as to inducement; and (4) the distinction between questions of
law and questions of fact with respect to government inducement.
A.

Is Inducement Proper?

Courts have recognized consistently that some form of government inducement or enticement may be appropriate in seeking to en-

gage the defendant in criminal conduct. Indeed, Chief Justice
Rehnquist has indicated that such government action may be not only
proper but also necessary, particularly in cases where the nature of the
criminal activity is such as to avoid criminal detection. In United
States v. Russell, 17 government agents supplied the defendants with an
ingredient that was difficult for the defendants to obtain, but necessary
to enable the defendants to manufacture an illegal drug. The government officers arrested the defendants as soon as the drug was manufactured. Justice Rehnquist responded to the defense argument that such
government involvement in crime was inherently improper:
13. Mo. REV. STAT.§ 562.066.2 (1978).
14. The matter is normally resolved at trial. Most claims cannot be disposed of pretrial.
See infra text accompanying notes 31-34.
15. 749 F.2d 1078 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3479 (1985).
16. /d. at 1085. But see State v. Martin, 77 N.C. App. 61, 334 S.E.2d 459 (1985); People v.
Boalbey, 143 Ill. App. 3d 362, 493 N.E.2d 369 (1986).
17. 411 u.s. 423 (1973).
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The illicit manufacture of drugs is not a sporadic, isolated criminal incident, but a continuing, though illegal,
business enterprise. In order to obtain convictions for illegally manufacturing drugs, the gathering of evidence of past
unlawful conduct frequently proves to be an all but impossible task. Thus in drug-related offenses law enforcement personnel have turned to one of the only practicable means of
detection: the infiltration of drug rings and a limited participation in their unlawful present practices. Such infiltration
is a recognized and permissible means of investigation; if that
be so, then the supply of some item of value that the drug
ring requires must, as a general rule, also be permissible. For
an agent will not be taken into the confidence of the illegal
entrepreneurs unless he has something of value to offer them.
Law enforcement tactics such as this can hardly be said to
violate "fundamental fairness" or [be] "shocking to the universal sense of justice." 18
Another judge recently pointed out that "the entrapment defense has
no application where the government agents merely use stealth, strategy, or deception to trap an 'unwary criminal' or merely provide the
defendant with an opportunity or facility to commit the crime." 19
It is clear, therefore, that inducement as such is not inherently
improper or unlawful under the subjective entrapment test. Inducement can, however, exceed permissible bounds and become suject to
sanction. Indeed, the very judge who made the comment quoted
above further remarked that the government cannot be involved in the
"manufacturing of crime." Citing the majority opinion in Sherman
the judge quoted, "The function of law enforcement is the prevention
of crime and the apprehension of criminals. Manifestly, that function
does not include the manufacturing of crime."20
18. 411 U.S. at 432. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, continued: "Nor does it
seem particularly desirable for the law to grant complete immunity from prosecution to one who
himself planned to commit a crime, and then committed it, simply because government undercover agents subjected him to inducement, which might have seduced a hypothetical individual
who was not so predisposed." !d. at 434. The dissenters in the case strongly disagreed with the
majority opinion.
In this case, the chemical ingredient was available only to licensed persons, and the
Government itself had requested suppliers not to sell that ingredient even to people
with a license. Yet the Government agent readily offered, and supplied, that ingredient
to an unlicensed person and asked him to make a certain illegal drug with it. The
Government then prosecuted that person for making the drug produced with the very
ingrediellt which its agent had so helpfully supplied. This strikes me as the very pattern
of conduct that should be held to constitute entrapment as a matter of law.
411 U.S. at 449 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
19. United States v. Lard, 734 F.2d 1290, 1293 (8th Cir. 1984).
20. Id. (quoting Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958)).
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The majority in Sherman emphasized that to " 'merely afford opportunities or facilities for the commission of the offense does not' constitute entrapment. Entrapment occurs only when the criminal
conduct was 'the product of the creative activity' of law enforcement
officials. " 21
In connection with the issue of inducement in entrapment cases,
two central questions arise: (1) procedurally, how does one prove sufficient inducement to have that issue submitted as a question of fact
for the jury; and (2) when is inducement sufficiently proved as a matter of law.

B. Proving Inducement: The Procedural Issues
In practice, relatively few procedural problems seem to arise with
respect to the inducement prong of the entrapment test. 22 The rules
may be stated with succinctness and clarity. It is not enough for the
defendant to show that government agents offered him an opportunity
to engage in criminal activity. Something more overreaching on the
part of the government is necessary. As stated by the court in United
States v. Christopher: "[It is not enough] that the Government furnished the opportunity for the commission of a crime.... [There must
still be] some evidence of inducement or persuasion by the
Government. " 23
The principal problem in this area arises with defining what is
sufficient government conduct to constitute inducement, and not the
mere offering of an opportunity.Z4 Nevertheless, the law is now wellsettled that the burden of offering evidence of inducement rests, at
21. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372 (quoting United States v. Sorrells, 287 U.S. 435, 241, 251
(1932)) (emphasis in Sherman).
22. For detailed discussion of the procedural issues involved with this question, see Marcus,
supra note 2.
23. 488 F.2d 849, 850·51 (9th Cir. 1973). The court in United States v. Andrews, 765 F.2d
1491, 1499 (11th Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 815 (1985), explained the basic
point:
[E]vidence that the government agent sought out or initiated contact with the defendant, or was the first to propose the illicit transaction, has been held to be insufficient to
meet the defendant's burden. The defendant must demonstrate not merely inducement
or suggestion on the part of the government but "an element of persuasion or mild
coercion." The defendant may make such a showing by demonstrating that he had not
favorably received the government plan and the government had had to "push it" on
him, or that several attempts at setting up an illicit deal had failed and on at least one
occasion he had directly refused to participate. When the defendant makes such a
showing, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant was predisposed to commit the offense charged.
24. This problem will be explored infra in text accompanying notes 35-88.
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least initially, on the defendant, not on the government. 25 If the defendant offers sufficient evidence of inducement, the burden then shifts
to the government with respect to the question of predisposition.
While the courts are not in agreement as to the evidentiary burden that the defense must meet, it is fair to say that the burden is a
limited one. Some courts require evidence which amounts to "more
than a scintilla," 26 others discuss "any foundation in the evidence;m
and still others mention "some evidence" of government inducement. 28 However, the majority of courts rely on the traditional preponderance of the evidence standard. Thus, if the defendant offers
evidence sufficient to demonstrate that he has more likely than not
been the victim of government inducement, the burden as to predisposition will then shift to the government. 29
The defendant at trial can satisfy the appropriate standard by offering evidence to demonstrate inducement, or by showing that the
government's evidence reveals its inducement. 30 The defendant generally cannot make this showing prior to the trial. The courts have been
fairly consistent in noting that the issues concerning inducement and
predisposition tend to be evidentiary in nature and are thus ill-suited
for pretrial decisions. In State v. Roberts the court refused to allow the
defendant to raise the entrapment defense during a pretrial hearing on
a motion to suppress. 31 Similarly, most courts will hold that when a

defendant seeks to enter a guilty plea, such a plea waives the defendant's right to claim the defense of entrapment. 32 An exception to the
25. See, e.g., United States v. Sarmiento, 786 F.2d 665, 667 (5th Cir. 1986). Some courts
have adopted a "unitary standard" such that if the defendant demonstrates some act of inducement by the government the case still cannot go to the jury unless there is evidence showing
"unreadiness" on the defendant's own part. See United States v. Gambino, 788 F.2d 938, 943
(3d Cir. 1986); Kadis v. United States, 373 F.2d 370, 374 (1st Cir. 1967). In some courts the
procedure becomes more awkward as to this unitary standard. These cases require the defendant
to respond to the government's showing of predisposition with a demonstration oflack of predisposition. See, e.g., the discussion in United States v. Burkley, 591 F.2d 903, 914 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 966 (1978).
26. United States v. Wollfs, 594 F.2d 77, 80 (5th Cir. 1979).
27. United States v. Timberlake, 559 F.2d 1375, 1379 (5th Cir. 1977).
28. Burkley, 591 F.2d at 914.
29. The preponderance test has been supported by the drafters of both the Model Penal
Code and the proposed revised Federal Criminal Code. Though each involves the objective test
(not the majority subjective test) the initial inducement burden appears similar in the MoDEL
PENAL CoDE§ 2.13(2) (1985) and the FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS§ 702(1) (1971).'
30. United States v. Gunter, 741 F.2d 151, 153 (7th Cir. 1984).
31. 471 So.2d 900 (La. Ct. App. 1985).
32. United States v. Yater, 756 F.2d 1058, 1063 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 225
(1985). See also Eaton v. United States, 458 F.2d 704, 707 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880
(1972).
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pretrial rule may be found in cases where a motion in limine is
brought. For example, in State v. Burciaga 33 the government announced at a pretrial hearing its intention to introduce evidence of the
defendant's prior conviction as bearing on the issue of his predisposition. The defendant's motion in limine on this point was granted and
affirmed on appeal. 34
The element of inducement can rarely be shown to be a question
of law that must be decided by the judge. Courts in almost all cases
have determined that both the questions of whether inducement existed and whether it was sufficient are questions of fact. The evidentiary burden to be met in order to have the judge decide the issue as a
matter of law is a high one: "[T]he evidence must clearly have indicated that a government agent originated the criminal design; that the
agent implanted in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to
commit the offense; and that the defendant then committed the criminal act at the urging of the government agent." 35
Defendants often lose their claims as a matter of law because all
they can show is that a government agent afforded an opportunity or
facilities for the commission of an offense. 36 The defendant will prevail as a matter of law only "when the criminal intent originates with
the officer and the defendant is lured or induced into the commission
of a crime he was not ready and willing to engage in . . . ." 37

Under unusual circumstances the defendant may win as a matter
of law. The most famous example is the United States Supreme Court
case of Sherman v. United States. 38 The defendant in Sherman had a
history of selling drugs and was being treated for narcotics addiction.
When a government agent approached the defendant in an attempt to
buy drugs, the defendant initially was reluctant to make the sale. Ultimately he acceded to the strong wishes of the informant. The defendant was convicted of selling drugs to the government agent. The
Court held that these facts showed entrapment as a matter of law39
and voiced strong disapproval of the government's actions:
The government informer entices someone attempting to
avoid narcotics not only into carrying out an illegal sale but
33. 146 Ariz. 333, 705 P.2d 1384 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985).
34. /d. at 1386-87.
35. United States v. Shaw, 570 F.2d 770, 772 (8th Cir. 1978).
36. United States v. Quinn, 543 F.2d 640, 647 (8th Cir. 1976). See also United States v.
Randolph, 738 F.2d 244 (8th Cir. 1984).
37. State v. Arnold, 676 S.W.2d 61, 62 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984). See generally United States v.
Lard, 734 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1984).
38. 356 u.s. 369 (1958).
39. /d. at 376.
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also into returning to the habit of use.... Thus the Government plays on the weaknesses of an innocent party and beguiles him into committing crimes which he otherwise would
not have attempted. Law enforcement does not require
methods such as this. 40
Sherman was expanded for some time to cover cases in which the
evidence clearly showed that government agents "supplied all the ingredients of the offense: the plan, the marijuana, the buyer, the money
for the purchase."41 Under such circumstances some courts held that
"[t]he criminal conduct is clearly the product of the creative activity of
the law enforcement offi.cers."42 However, the Supreme Court
sounded the death knell for this principle in Hampton v. United

States. 43 In Hampton the Court noted that the essential question in
such a case of government involvement was not the degree of government activity, but rather the predisposition of the defendant. 44
Judge Gesell presented one of the most thoughtful and detailed
discussions of the question of inducement as a matter of law in one of
the major Abscam cases, United States v. Kelly. 45 In Kelly the FBI
created a fictitious organization, Abdul Enterprises, through which it
conducted a series of negotiations that resulted in making contact with
the defendant about assisting a member of the organization with an
immigration problem. An arrangement was made in which the defendant, a Congressman, would receive $25,000 "as a down payment if
he promised to introduce immigration legislation on behalf of one of
the sheiks."46 Later the defendant was promised a total sum of
$500,000 for his assistance with this problem. Additionally, millions
of dollars were to be invested in the defendant's congressional district
in Florida. Numerous negotiations and alterations of the arrangement
occurred. The FBI videotaped the defendant as he reassured the principals that he would perform the requested services. The defendant
was convicted of: (1) conspiracy to commit bribery and to defraud the
United States;47 (2) bribery;48 and (3) interstate travel to engage in
racketeering enterprises.49 The jury was instructed that it could acquit
40. Jd. (footnote omitted).
41. State v. Boccelli, 105 Ariz. 495, 497, 467 P.2d 740, 742 (1970) (en bane).
42. !d. at 742. See also United States v. Bueno, 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
411 u.s. 949 (1973).
43. 425 u.s. 484 (1976).
44. Jd. at 488, 489.
45. 748 F.2d 691 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
46. Jd. at 693.
47. 18 u.s.c. § 371 (1982).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) (1982).
49. 18 u.s.c. § 1952 (1982).
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the defendant based upon the entrapment claim if it found that the
defendant had been induced to commit the crime and that there was a
reasonable doubt concerning his predisposition.
The defendant in Kelly argued that inducement had been established as a matter of law; therefore, the issue should not have been
submitted to the jury. The court recognized that "[i]nducement focuses on whether the government's conduct could have caused an undisposed person to commit a crime." 50 The court noted that the
inquiry was an objective one "measuring whether the government's
behavior was such that a law-abiding citizen's will to obey the law
could have been overborne." 51 The defendant argued that the case
should never have gone to the jury on the inducement question because the evidence was clearly sufficient on this issue. The government
contended that its offer to the defendant amounted to nothing more
than giving the defendant "a single opportunity to commit a crime." 52
The court ultimately decided that this issue was a question for the jury
that could not be decided as a matter of law:
Reasonable persons could differ as to whether the amount of
money offered Kelly and the manner in which the offer unfolded went beyond merely offering Kelly an opportunity to
commit a crime. The question of how a reasonable person
would have reacted is a quintessential jury issue, and the evidence here is not so unequivocal to mandate one conclusion
or another. Although the trial court had a personal view
that there was some evidence of inducement, it was scrupu-

lously correct in deciding that a reasonable juror could come
to a different conclusion, and it correctly refused to find inducement as a matter of law. 5 3
The focus of the inducement issue, whether "government conduct
... created a risk of persuading [an] unpredisposed person to commit
the crime," 54 is especially appropriate for jury determination. The
type of government activity and its impact on the defendant almost
always appear to be issues for the jury. The Fifth Circuit stated in
50. 748 F.2d at 697.
51. /d. at 698.
52. /d.
53. Id. (citations and footnotes omitted). In People v. Boalbey, 143 III. App. 3d 362, 493
N.E.2d 369 (1986), entrapment was found as a matter of law. The case concerned the sale of
food stamps. No evidence regarding the defendant's predisposition was ever offered. The gov·
ernment's proof of the defendant's willingness to participate "cannot fill the evidentiary void."
/d. at 371.
54. State v. Jones, 416 A.2d 676, 677 (R.I. 1980). See also United States v. Manning, 787
F.2d 431, 437 (8th Cir. 1986).
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United States v. Yater :55 "The government's provision of aid, incentive, and opportunity to commit the crime does not amount to entrapment unless it appears that the 'defendant has done that which he
would never have done were it not for the inducement of Government
operatives.' " 56
The jury should hear most issues involving inducement. 57 However, the question of inducement is usually a question of law for the
judge when the defendant can only offer evidence that "a government
agent has provided the accused with the opportunity or facilities for
the commission of the crime.''58 This principle has been stated repeatedly and consistently in the jurisdictions that have adopted the subjective standard. For example, Georgia does not recognize an
entrapment defense "when the officer merely furnishes an opportunity
to a person who is ready to commit the offense." 59 In the federal
courts the principle is the same. In United States v. Kadis 60 the court
stated, "[There must be evidence] that a government agent corrupted
him ... but such a showing is not made simply by evidence of a solicitation."61 The First Circuit approved the district court's charge that
"entrapment means that law enforcement officials, acting either directly or through an agent, induced or persuaded an otherwise unwilling person to commit an unlawful act.'' 62 The court went on to say,
" '[M]erely affording the defendant the opportunity for commission of
the offense does not constitute entrapment.' " 63
This theory is applied most often in cases in which the government allegations involve drug violations, fraud schemes, or the commission of sexual offenses. The government allegations in United
55. 756 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 225 (1985).
56. Id. at 1062 (quoting United States v. Bower, 575 F.2d 499, 504 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 983 (1978)). The court quoted extensively from earlier decisions in elaborating on this
explanation. In a footnote, the court adopted the language of Pierce v. United States, 414 F.2d
163, 168 (5th Cir. 1969), to the effect that the defense could be raised where the government
conduct created "a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by a person other than
one ready to commit it ...•" The court made it clear that merely providing an opportunity to
commit the crime did not create such a risk. Id. at n.6.
57. See infra text accompanying notes 74-86.
58. Yater, 156 F.2d at 1062 n.6.
59. Verble v. State, 172 Ga. App. 321, 321, 323 S.E.2d 239, 241 (1984).
60. 373 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1967). Remember that the First Circuit expressly rejected the
"bifurcation" of the test for entrapment between inducement and predisposition. Id. at 373-74.
That court has persisted in that view. United States v. Parisi, 674 F.2d 126, 127 (1st Cir. 1982).
For a discussion of this "unitary" standard see supra note 25.
61. 373 F.2d at 374.
62. United States v. Bibbey, 735 F.2d 619, 621 (1st Cir. 1984).

63. /d. at 621-22 (quoting United States v. Fera, 616 F.2d 590, 596 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
446

u.s. 969 (1980)).
63
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States v. Gunter 64 involved drug violations. The defendant in Gunter
offered evidence that a government agent contacted him and agreed to
buy cocaine from him. 65 The court was unimpressed with the claim
and voiced "serious doubts as to whether there was even enough evidence of inducement ... to raise the defense of entrapment." 66 The
court discussed the point further:
The only evidence of entrapment before the first sale was [the
police agent's] testimony that he made contact with [the defendant] several times to set up the drug purchase, and that
he paid $1,200 for what turned out to be 12.3 grams of cocaine. We are not impressed by defendant's argument that
[the police agent's] admission that he made contact with [the
defendant] demonstrates either a lack of predisposition or
Government inducement. Drug dealers are not known to

call potential clients and solicit their business, rather a dealer
who expects to stay out of jail is careful about to whom he
sells. That [the police agent] made several calls to arrange
the sale is also not extraordinary. Drug deals often take time
to arrange. We are similarly unimpressed by defendant's
claim that $1,200 was such a large amount of money to pay
for the cocaine that it amounted to undue inducement. This
argument ignores that defendants claimed to be providing 14
grams, not 12.3 grams, and that it was only their own dishonesty that reaped them greater profit. Second, there was
evidence that cocaine often sold for $100 a gram, so $1,200
for more than 12 grams was not unusual. The mere solicitation by [the police agent], and the offer of an opportunity to
commit the crime, does not show entrapment. 67
The rule is also followed in fraud cases such as United States v.
Randolph 68 where the defendant was found guilty of unlawfully acquiring food stamp coupons. An undercover agent of the United
States Department of Agriculture contacted the defendant in Ran64. 741 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1984).
65. What is so troublesome in many of these cases is the "unclean hands" of the govern·
ment agent who is alleged to have entrapped the defendant. As the court in Gunter noted:
As with many informants, Gannon was not motivated by a fervent desire to combat
crime, but rather by a promise that his work would reduce the consequences of his own
criminal conduct. In return for setting up purchases from drug dealers Gannon was to
receive consideration on charges that he stole a late model Corvette Stingray automo·
bile. Gannon also received $100 for every purchase.
Id. at 152.
66. /d. at 153.
67. Id. at 153-54. Following this general principle in drug cases are these opinions: State v.
Martin, 713 P.2d 60 (Utah 1986); State v. Gilman, 110 R.I. 207, 291 A.2d 425 (1972); Goss-

meyer v. State, 482 N.E.2d 239 {Ind. 1985); and Gonzales v. State, 697 S.W.2d 50 (Tex. App.Beaumont 1985, pet. ref'd).
68. 738 F.2d 244 (8th Cir. 1984).
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dolph and offered to sell her food stamp coupons at a discount. The

offer was to sell the food stamps for a discount of more than 50% of
their face value, a clear violation of federal law. 69 This transaction
was the basis of the conviction. The defendant claimed that she had
been entrapped as a matter of law because of the government's improper action. The court rejected this argument: "There was no evidence that [the agent] did anything other than offer [defendant] the
opportunity to commit a crime. This does not constitute
entrapment. " 70
In Verble v. State 71 the court considered the defense claim on the
inducement issue in connection with various sex crimes. The police
officers in Verble contacted the defendants while investigating advertisements placed in a magazine. The language in the magazine led the
officers to believe that by placing the ads the defendants were advertising sex for hire. The officers contacted the defendants through a
phone number listed in the ads, arranged for a meeting at a motel
room, and gave money to the defendants. The defendants told the
officers that in exchange for the money the men would perform sodomy on the officers. The defendants claimed that they had been entrapped into committing the crime and thus could not be found guilty.
The court concluded that a guilty verdict was indeed appropriate because the evidence showed that "the officer merely furnished appellants an opportunity to solicit sodomy and that they were also guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. " 72
As Sherman illustrates, it is possible for the defendant to win his
inducement claim as a matter of law. However, it is more likely that
the defendant will fail to offer sufficient evidence to establish induce-

ment as a matter of law and, instead, will be able to offer evidence only
of the government's offering him an opportunity to engage in criminal
activities.73 The inducement issue is generally a jury question to be
raised in connection with the issue of predisposition.
69. In violation of 7 U.S.C. § 2024(b) (1982).
70. 738 F.2d at 246 (quoting Holmes v. United States, 709 F.2d 19, 20 (8th Cir. 1983) (per
curiam) (citation omitted)). See also United States v. Quinn, 543 F.2d 640 (8th Cir. 1976) (dis·
cussing test to find entrapment as a matter of law).
71. 172 Ga. App. 321, 323 S.E.2d 239 (1984).
72. Id. at 321-22, 323 S.E.2d at 241.
73. The very nature of some crimes may make it difficult for the defendant to use the inducement claim. For instance, in State v. Jones, 598 S.W.2d 209 (Tenn. 1980), the court noted
that "where solicitation is the gist of an offense and an indispensable element thereof, the defense
of entrapment is not available. One may not be solicited into soliciting. He is either the solicitor
or the solicitee. If the former, he may not be the latter." Id. at 221.
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The True Inducement Problem: A Jury Question

In the vast majority of cases the inducement issue is submitted as
a jury issue because the defendant can usually offer fairly substantial
evidence of government involvement, and the prosecution does not
normally contest such evidence. 74 The traditional test for determining
when the inducement matter will be submitted as a jury issue was
stated by the Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Boccelli :75 "Entrapment is a question for the jury unless there is no evidence to support
the defense, or unless uncontradicted testimony makes it patently clear
that an otherwise innocent person has been induced to commit the
acts." 76 A more recent statement of the principle can be found in
United States v. Yater: 17
The question of entrapment goes to the basic guilt or
innocence of the defendant.... "The concern is thus that the
accused is not guilty, since he had no criminal intent not implanted by the government, rather than that he is guilty but
may avoid the consequences of his criminal conduct because
of the government's undue inducement." Because entrapment involves the basic determination of guilt or innocence,
it is a jury issue . . .. 78
Several cases illustrate the manner in which the inducement issue
can be raised before the jury. In State v. Jones 79 the defendant became
involved in a scheme devised by government agents to secure a conviction of the defendant for violation of gun control laws. The agents
worked closely with the defendant and deceived him with respect to
their ultimate goal. In response to the defense argument that such
conduct established .entrapment as a matter of law, the court con-

cluded that "[a]s distasteful as this may be, it is a legitimate weapon in
the arsenal of law enforcement. The law does not mandate a frank,
forthright or even honest approach when seeking to ferret out criminal
activity." 80 The court stressed that the record be made clear that gov74. The true battleground in most of these cases deals with predisposition. See infra text
accompanying notes 88-126.
75. 105 Ariz. 495, 467 P.2d 740 (1970).
76. /d. at 497, 467 P.2d at 742 (citation omitted). There must exist some doubt today as to
the court's ultimate holding in Boccelli concerning a finding of entmpment due to the government's involvement in manufacturing the drugs and providing a buyer. See the discussion in the
Hampton case in Marcus, The Development of Entrapment Law, 33 WAYNE ST. L. REV. 5
(1987).
77. 756 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 225 (1985).
78. /d. at 1062 (quoting United States v. Henry, 749 F.2d 203, 210 (5th Cir. 1984) (en
bane)).
79. 598 S.W.2d 209 (Tenn. 1980).
80. /d. at 212.
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ernment agents were closely involved with the defendant's activities,
making false and fraudulent representations, but that the evidence was
not sufficient to show, as a matter of law, that he had been induced
into committing the crime. 81
In United States v. Knight 82 the defendant waived his right to a
jury trial and was brought before the judge for possession and transfer
of a "sawed-off, shotgun. 83 The defendant's primary evidence with
respect to inducement was his testimony that he offered to sell the
weapon in an "unsawed-off" state, but the government agent insisted
that he would buy the weapon only if the barrel of it was shortened to
a length that was prohibited by law. The defendant agreed to saw the
barrel off only on the second meeting, after first having refused the
government request to saw it off. He stated that he ultimately sawed
the barrel off because he needed the money. The trial judge held that
this evidence was sufficient to demonstrate government inducement
under any of the applicable standards. The court then focused its attention on the question of the predisposition of the defendant to commit the offense. The court ultimately had doubts as to the defendant's
predisposition at the time of the initial contact between him and the
government and found the defendant not guilty. 84
Another good illustration of the way in which the inducement
issue usually comes before the trier of fact can be found in United

States v. Kelly, 85 another case involving one of the numerous Abscam
prosecutions. The defendant argued that because he had been promised such a large sum of money there was no triable issue concerning
inducement. His position was that inducement had been shown as a
matter of law because the offer of such a large sum of money was
government conduct that "could have caused an undisposed person to
commit a crime." 86 The court strongly rejected this argument:
Reasonable persons could differ as to whether the amount of
money offered Kelly and the manner in which the offer unfolded went beyond merely offering Kelly an opportunity to
commit a crime. The question of how a reasonable person
81. Id. at 220.
82. 604 F. Supp. 984 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
83. In violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d), (e) and 5871 (1982).
84. The judge relied heavily on the fact that it took two meetings for the defendant to be
persuaded to saw off the barrel and the government's knowledge of the defendant's precarious
financial condition. There appeared to be genuine reluctance on the part of the defendant which
was only overcome by a relationship purposely established by the government. 604 F. Supp. at
987.
85. 748 F.2d 691 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
86. Id. at 697.
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would have reacted is a quintessential jury issue, and the evidence here is not so unequivocal to mandate one conclusion
or another. 87
D.

Proving Predisposition

The subjective test enunciated by the Supreme Court is based
upon two factors: inducement and predisposition. As has been noted
previously, however, the predisposition aspect is the major concern
and has been the chief source of litigation in the area. The very nature
of the subjective test necessitates a showing of predisposition. As
Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out in the Russell case:
[E]ntrapment is a relatively limited defense. It is rooted, not
in any authority of the Judicial Branch to dismiss prosecutions for what it feels to have been "overzealous law enforcement," but instead in the notion that Congress could not
have intended criminal punishment for a defendant who has
committed all the elements of a proscribed offense but was
induced to commit them by the Government. 88
When the question is whether the defendant committed the crime
solely because of inducement by the government, the inquiry naturally
focuses on the state of mind of the defendant at the time of the inducement. The Supreme Court took this position in its first major entrapment decision, Sorrells v. United States :
The defense is available, not in the view that the accused
though guilty may go free, but that the government cannot
be permitted to contend that he is guilty of a crime where the
government officials are the instigators of his conduct. The
federal courts in sustaining the defense in such circumstances have proceeded in the view that the defendant is not
guilty.89
The "controlling question [thus is] whether the defendant is a
person otherwise innocent .... " 90 Given that reliance on the defendant's state of mind is the controlling question, it is impossible for the
defendant to complain when the evidence in the case centers on prov-

ing his predisposition:
[I]f the defendant seeks acquittal by reason of entrapment he
cannot complain of an appropriate and searching inquiry
into his own conduct and predisposition as bearing upon that
issue. If in consequence he suffers a disadvantage, he has
87.
88.
89.
90.
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Id. at 698 (footnotes omitted).
United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973).
287 u.s. 435, 452 (1932).
Id. at 451.
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brought it upon himself by reason of the nature of the
defense. 91

In applying the predisposition analysis, courts have stated the
problem in a variety of ways. The Seventh Circuit in United States v.
Fields 92 noted that predisposition "refers to whether the defendant
had a readiness and willingness to commit the offenses charged, or
whether the government implanted in the mind of an innocent person
the disposition to commit the offense." 93 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit
commented that the issue is whether the defendant exhibited "a predisposition to commit an offense, [because] the governmental participation in the commission of an offense by itself cannot be the basis of
an entrapment defense." 94
The state courts have followed a similar pattern. In State v.
Duncan 95 the court stated that entrapment is "the inducement of one
to commit a crime not contemplated by him, for the mere purpose of
instituting a criminal prosecution against him." 96 One Ohio court put
the matter rather neatly:
Where the criminal design for an offense originates with government agents and they implant in the mind of an innocent
person the disposition to commit the act and induce its commission, the defendant has been entrapped; likewise, there is
no entrapment when an agent merely affords the opportunity
for the offense and the accused had a predisposition to commit the offense. 97
While the subjective test is simply stated, it is still the case that
"[p]redisposition is necessarily a nebulous concept .... " 98 Numerous
91. /d. at 451-52.
92. 689 F.2d 122 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1089 (1982).
93. /d. at 124 (quoting Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 442).

94. United States v. Leja, 563 F.2d 244, 245 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1074
(1978).
95. 75 N.C. App. 23, 330 S.E.2d 481 (1985).
96. /d., 330 S.E.2d at 487 (quoting State v. Stanley, 288 N.C. 19, 27, 215 S.E.2d 589, 594
(1975)). The court quoted State v. Walker, 295 N.C. 510, 513, 246 S.E.2d 748, 749-50 (1978), to
elaborate on the point:
The defense of entrapment consists of two elements: (1) acts of persuasion, trickery or
fraud carried out by law enforcement officers or their agents to induce a defendant to
commit a crime, (2) when the criminal design originated in the minds of the government officials, rather than with the innocent defendant, such that the crime is the product of the creative activity of the law enforcement authorities.
/d. (citations omitted).
97. State v. Woods, 20 Ohio Misc. 2d 1, 484 N.E.2d 773, 774 (Ct. C.P. 1984).
98. United States v. Hunt, 749 F.2d 1078, 1085 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3479
(1985). The court explained the difficult nature of the predisposition test:
The standard jury instruction on entrapment, as given here, asks whether the defendant was "ready and willing" to commit crimes such as charged whenever the op-
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statutes have been adopted to provide guidance in the area of proving
predisposition. The Missouri statute is fairly typical:
An "entrapment" is perpetuated [sic] if a law enforcement
officer or a person acting in cooperation with such an officer,
for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the commission of
an offense, solicits, encourages or otherwise induces another
person to engage in conduct when he was not ready and willing to engage in such conduct. 99
Both federal and state courts have followed the standard rule
with respect to proving predisposition. Where the defendant has
presented sufficient evidence of inducement by government authorities, 100 "the burden rests on the government to overcome an entrapment defense." 101 The court in United States v. Gunter 102 explained
the matter even more clearly: "Once a defendant accomplishes this
[evidence of inducement], the burden shifts to the Government to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was predisposed
or that there was no Government inducement." 103
The predisposition issue is almost always a question of fact for the
jury. In essence the question centers on the individual's state of mind
at the time of the government inducement, a matter naturally given to
the trier of fact. 104 The question of predisposition will not be an issue
portunity was afforded. This is hardly more illuminating than the general notion of
predisposition itself, given that one's willingness to commit a crime would necessarily
depend on the level of inducement offered and the circumstances created by government agents. "Persistent offers, exorbitant amounts of money, and appeals to emotion
or civic duty may seduce a person of ordinary firmness into a compromising position."
It is simply naive to suppose that public officials, or other defendants, can be neatly
divided between the pure of heart and those with a "criminal" outlook.
ld. at n.9 (citations omitted) (quoting Gershman, Abscam, the Judiciary, and the Ethics of Entrapment, 91 YALE L.J. 1565, 1584 (1982).
99. Mo. REv. STAT. § 562.066.2 (1978). The court in State v. Arnold, 676 S.W.2d 61, 62
(Mo. Ct. App. 1984) explored the rationale for the statute:
[W]hen the criminal intent originates with the officer and the defendant is lured or
induced into the commission of a crime he was not ready and willing to engage in, then,
as a general rule an entrapment has occurred and no conviction may be had. On the
other hand, if the criminal intent originates in the mind of the defendant, it is no defense to the charge that an opportunity is furnished or that an officer aids in the commission of the crime.
100. On the question of the sufficiency of the evidence regarding inducement, see supra text
accompanying notes 35-53.
101. Hunt, 749 F.2d at 1085.
102. 741 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1984).
103. /d. at 153. See also United States v. Perez-Leon, 757 F.2d 866, 871-72 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 99 (1985).
104. The court in Hunt noted that the predisposition concept was a nebulous one and that
the instructions regarding predisposition were based upon the naive view that defendants could
be divided between "the pure of heart and those with a 'criminal' outlook." The court found that
the situation thus called for jucy determinations generally. "As it would appear, however, to be
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for the jury when either "the undisputed facts establish the entrapment defense as a matter of law, ... or where the evidence is simply
insufficient to submit the issue to the jury ...." 105
One case in which the "undisputed evidence demonstrate[d] a
clear absence of predisposition" 106 was Sherman v. United States. 107
The issue of predisposition, therefore, was not submitted to the jury.
The Sherman Court concluded from the undisputed testimony of the
government's own witness that the defendant was induced to sell
drugs by the government agent and that he would not have otherwise
attempted to do so. The government agent had made persistent requests of the defendant and had finally succeeded in overbearing the
defendant's will. The Supreme Court decided that entrapment had occurred because the criminal act of the defendant was the product of
the creative activity of a law enforcement agent. 108
A case in which "the evidence [was] plainly insufficient as a matter of law" 109 to present the predisposition issue as a question of fact
for the jury was United States v. Armocida. 110 The defendant in
Armocida was convicted of distributing and conspiring to distribute
heroin. The government agent contacted the defendant and offered to
provide him with quinine if the defendant could provide heroin in return. Although it took several months of discussion before the defendant provided this heroin, the evidence was clear that "the delay was
not due to any reluctance on [the defendant's] part. Rather, [the defendant] attributed the delay entirely to problems getting heroin from
'his people.' " 111 The court concluded that there was simply no evidence negating the propensity of the defendant's part to sell the heroin; he had offered no affirmative evidence demonstrating a lack of
intent to sell the narcotics.
impossible to formulate a more coherent definition of predisposition consistent with the Supreme
Court's decisions, the whole matter is best left to the discretion of juries, constrained only perhaps in the use of unreliable character evidence ...." 749 F.2d at 1085 n.9.
105. United States v. Jannotti, 673 F.2d 578, 597 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106
(1982).
106. United States v. Knight, 604 F. Supp. 984, 986 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
107. 356 u.s. 369 (1958).
108. Id. at 372 (citing Sa"e//s, 287 U.S. at 441, 451). The Court was willing to find entrapment as a matter of law because they were "not choosing between conflicting witnesses, nor
judging credibility.... Aside from recalling ... the Government's witness, the defense called no
witnesses. [They reached their] conclusion from the undisputed testimony of the prosecution's
witnesses. 356 U.S. at 373.
109. Hunt, 749 F.2d at 1085.
110. 515 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1975).
111. Id. at 56.
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[T]he evidence suggests that he was completely willing to
provide it once he could obtain it from "his people." [The
defendant] could have presented evidence negating propensity either through his own testimony, by cross-examining ·

Government witnesses or by any other means, but he failed
to do so. At most, the evidence to which [the defendant]
directs us falls short of creating a jury question on the issue
of propensity. 112
Because the primary focus in entrapment cases is on the defendant's predisposition to commit the crime, and not on the actions of the
government, 113 some courts today follow what has been labeled the
"unitary standard." 114 In these courts, the defendant must offer sufficient evidence of the inducement and "at least suggest that the defendant was initially unwilling to commit the crime, or that Government
involvement planted the criminal design in the defendant's mind."m
Thus, in the case in which the defendant is not apparently reluctant to
engage in the criminal conduct, the mere "fact that a Government
informant made the initial contact is overshadowed by [defendant's]
uninduced willingness to conclude a deal." 116
Most courts, however, have not moved to the unitary standard of
requiring defense evidence on both inducement and lack of predisposition. Instead, the standard rule has been that if the defendant offers
adequate evidence of inducement, the burden then shifts to the government to prove lack of predisposition beyond a reasonable doubt. 117
Many courts hold that if the defendant "has presented substantial evidence of entrapment, the State must produce evidence to show the
defendant's predisposition to commit the crime. Failure to do so subjects the State to the adverse direction of a judgment of acquitta1." 118
Periodically, courts applying the subjective test have held that
certain types of government conduct constitute entrapment, wholly
apart from consideration of the evidence regarding predisposition.
112. /d. (citation omitted).
113. United States v. Fleishman, 684 F.2d 1329, 1342 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1044
(1982).
114. For a detailed discussion of the standard, see Marcus, supra note 2, at 203.
115. Fleishman, 684 F.2d at 1342.
116. /d. at 1343.
117. See United States v. Sarmiento, 786 F.2d 665, 667 (5th Cir. 1986).
118. State v. Devine, 554 S.W.2d 442, 447 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977). See also State v. Jones, 416
A.2d 676, 684 (R.I. 1980):
When the defendant introduces sufficient evidence of inducement to raise the question
of entrapment but the state adduces no evidence of predisposition in rebuttal, the trial
justice must find as a matter of law that entrapment has occurred. However, if the state
introduces evidence of defendant's predisposition, the jury must resolve the question of
entrapment.
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Therefore, if a certain kind of inducement is demonstrated in these
courts, the government will not be given an opportunity to show predisposition because the defendant has sustained the entire burden with
respect to entrapment. 119 Perhaps the now discredited opinion in
United States v. Bueno 120 best illustrates a court's application of this
rule. In Bueno a government agent provided the defendant with heroin, and the defendant then sold this heroin to another government
agent. The court stated: "The story takes on the element of the government buying heroin from itself, through an intermediary, the defendant, and then charging him with the crime." 121
The court in Bueno held that if this evidence were to be believed
the defendant could not, as a matter of law, be convicted of a drug
offense. 122 This reasoning was overwhelmingly rejected by the United
States Supreme Court in Hampton v. United States. 123 The facts of
Hampton were similar to those in Bueno. However, the defense in
Hampton requested a specific instruction dealing with the issue:
If you find that the defendant's sales of narcotics were
sales of narcotics supplied to him by an informer in the employ of or acting on behalf of the government, then you must
acquit the defendant because the law as a matter of policy
forbids his conviction in such a case.
Furthermore, under this particular defense, you need
not consider the predisposition of the defendant to commit
the offense charged, because if the governmental involvement
through its informer reached the point that I have just defined in your own minds, then the predisposition of the defendant would not matter. 124
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority of the Court, rejected
this position. Relying on the traditional predisposition test, the Court

noted that the defendant had not been entrapped as a matter of law
and that none of his constitutional rights had been violated: 125
119. It has also been suggested that "[t]he greater the inducement, the heavier the government's burden of proving predisposition." Jannotti, 673 F.2d at 619-20 (Aldisart, J., dissenting).
See also United States v. Watson, 489 F.2d 504, 511 (3d Cir. 1973).
120. 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 949 (1973).
121. Id. at 905.
122. Id.
123. 425 u.s. 484 (1976).
124. /d. at 488 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 9).
125. The court relied principally on the due process argument of the defendant.
The limitations of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment come into play
only when the Government activity in question violates some protected right of the
defendant. . . . But the police conduct here no more deprived defendant of any right
secured to him by the United States Constitution than did the police conduct in Russell
deprive Russell of any rights.
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[T]he statutory defense of entrapment was not available

where it was conceded that a Government agent supplied a
necessary ingredient in the manufacture of an illicit drug....
[T]he entrapment defense "focus[es] on the intent or predisposition of the defendant to commit the crime," rather than
upon the conduct of the Government's agents. We ruled out
the possibility that the defense of entrapment could ever be
based upon governmental misconduct in a case, such as this
one, where the predisposition of the defendant to commit the
crime was established. 126

III.

THE PROOF PRINCIPLES STATED: TOTALITY OF
CIRCUMSTANCES

For some time the courts provided little assistance to lawyers and
trial judges concerning the kind of evidence or the principles of application to be used in demonstrating predisposition. The following
statement taken from an opinion of the Tennessee Supreme Court was
typical:
Predisposition may be established by evidence of prior
crimes of a similar character . . . or by evidence, direct or
circumstantial, that the accused was ready and willing to engage in the illegal conduct in question. Evidence of the defendant's reputation bears upon the issue. A finding of
predisposition should be based on the totality of the
circumstances." 127
Although the courts have attempted to use this "totality of circumstances" approach, more recently they have identified specific factors to be weighed by both trial judges and juries. The court in United
States v. Navarro 128 began its discussion of this area by noting the

difficulty in "divining" a defendant's predisposition once the crime has
been committed. 129 It then enunciated guidelines which it thought
would be helpful in determining the defendant's state of mind:
(1) the character or reputation of the defendant;
(2) whether the suggestion of criminal activity was originally made by the Government;
Id. at 490-91 (emphasis in original).
126. Id. at 488-89 (quoting Russel/, 411 U.S. at 429).
127. State v. Jones, 598 S.W.2d 209, 220 (Tenn. 1980). See generally United States v. Roland, 748 F.2d 1321, 1327 (2d Cir. 1984).
128. 737 F.2d 625 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1020 (1984).
129. Id. at 635. The court cited United States v. Kaminski, 703 F.2d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir.
1983) and United States v. Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. 1182, 1191 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd on other
grounds, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982), to define "predisposition" as
the defendant's state of mind before exposure to government agents.
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(3) whether the defendant was engaged in criminal activity
for a profit;
(4) whether the defendant evidenced reluctance to commit
the offense, overcome by Government persuasion;
(5) the nature of the inducement or persuasion offered by
the Government. 130
These guidelines have been widely employed by courts throughout the country. 131 However, some courts have gone beyond the principles stated in Navarro in their attempts to identify the type of
evidence that should be considered by the trier of fact. 132 The court in
United States v. Dian 133 identified a total of ten factors to be considered in determining predisposition:
(1) whether the defendant readily responded to the inducement offered;
(2) the circumstances surrounding the illegal conduct;
(3) the state of mind of a defendant before government
agents make any suggestion that he shall commit a
crime;
(4) whether the defendant was engaged in an existing
course of conduct similar to the crime for which he is
charged;
(5) whether the defendant had already formed the "design"
to commit the crime for which he is charged;

(6) the defendant's reputation;
(7) the conduct of the defendant during the negotiations
with the undercover agent;
(8) whether the defendant has refused to commit similar
acts on other occasions;
(9) the nature of the crime charged;
(10) the degree of coercion present in the instigation law officers have contributed to the transaction relative to the
defendant's criminal background. 134
130. Id. (quoting United States v. Thoma, 726 F.2d 1191, 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104
S.Ct. 2683 (1984)).
131. See United States v. Perez-Leon, 757 F.2d 866, 871 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 99
(1985); United States v. Busby, 780 F.2d 804, 807 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Knight, 604
F. Supp. 984, 987 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
132. Such a conclusion may be in response to the statement of several judges that an "apparent willingness" on the part of the defendant may not be sufficient. See, e.g., United States v.
Becker, 62 F.2d 1007, 1009 (2d Cir. 1933) ("[W]e do not wish to commit ourselves to the doctrine that mere readiness is enough ... /').
133. 762 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 106 S. Ct. 2216 (1986).
134. Id. at 687-88 (citations omitted).
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A.

The Time Factor

Usually, the time factor concerning the defendant's state of mind
does not present a major difficulty because "the time of [the government] contact is usually simultaneous with, or very close to, the time
the crime is committed." 135 Hence, it is not surprising that many
courts give only slight consideration to the time element in determining predisposition. Indeed, the standard rule is that "predisposition
refers to the state of mind of a defendant before government agents
make any suggestion that he should commit a crime." 136 Stated another way, predisposition refers to "the defendant's state of mind and
inclinations before his initial exposure to government agents." 137
In other cases, however, the matter is more complex and far more
significant. For example, in United States v. Lasuita government
agents contacted the defendant regarding the sale of marijuana. The
defendant called the agent several times after that initial contact to
request additional information. Three weeks later the defendant
agreed to purchase the marijuana and did so. The trial judge instructed the jury that the key issue in the case was whether the defendant had "a prior intent or a predisposition to commit the offense ... or

was the Defendant induced by law enforcement officers and their
agents to commit the offense when he had no prior intent or disposition to do so?" 138 After deliberating for a while the jury returned with
a question for the court: "Does the government have to prove, beyond
a reasonable doubt, that prior to contact with the U.S. Government or
its agents, that the Defendant was ready and/or willing to enter into
an illegal act?" (emphasis added by the court). 139 The trial judge answered the question, "No."
The Sixth Circuit considered Lasuita on appeal and found that
the trial court's negative response meant, in essence, that the jury had
been informed that the government did not have to prove that the
defendant was willing to commit the crime prior to contact with the
government agents. 140 Therefore, the real question for the court was
whether the predisposition of the defendant to commit the crime
would have to exist at the time of his contact with the agents, or '~ust
135. United States v. Lasuita, 752 F.2d 249, 254 (6th Cir. 1985).
136. United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603, 618 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1007
(1983).
137. United States v. Iannotti, 501 F. Supp. 1182, 1191 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd on other
grounds, 673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1106 (1982).
138. 752 F.2d at 252.
139. Id.
140. ld. at 253.
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before committing the offense," which was three weeks after the initial
contact. 141 The court explored case decisions in the area and decided
that the case law suggested, although it did not expressly state, that
the government's burden related to the defendant's state of mind at the
time of the initial contact, rather than to any disposition which might
thereafter develop:
[T]he prosecution must show that the defendant was willing
to commit the offense at the time when the government
agents initially contacted the defendant to propose the
wrongful conduct. The agents may not take a defendant
who is initially truly unwilling to commit the offense and
then induce him to become a criminal. 142
The negative response of the Lasuita trial court to the jury's question
may have led the jurors to conclude that it made no difference that the
defendant had no criminal predisposition at the time of the government contact. The appellate court found, therefore, that the trial
judge "should have advised the jury that the predisposition has to exist
at the time of the initial contact." 143 The defendant's conviction was
reversed.
The Supreme Court of Delaware reached a different conclusion
regarding the time element in Harrison v. State. 144 The defendant in
Harrison was charged with taking drugs into a state prison. Her argument was that she was not predisposed to commit the crime at the
time of the initial government contact but developed this state of mind
only after a series of discussions with a police officer. The court recog-

nized that most judges had focused their attention on the state of mind
of the defendant "just before a government agent enlisted his participation in the venture." 145 The Harrison court was troubled, however,
by the focus being "wholly on the issue of predisposition to the time
period 'just before' the police solicited defendant to participate in the
criminal scheme." 146
The application of the rule ... would provide an entrapment
defense to every individual who establishes an unblemished
personal record prior to being approached to commit a
crime. Furthermore, it is often the case that "the sole proof
of predisposition consists of evidence as to what the defend141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 254.
442 A.2d 1377 (Del. 1982).
Id. at 1385 (quoting United States v. West, 511 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975)).
Id. at 1386.
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ant did on the occasion in question, in response to the overtures of the government agents.'*7
Thus, the Harrison court refused to rely exclusively on consideration
of the time period before the initial contact:
[T]he interval between the solicitation and the actual commission of the offense is highly significant on the question of
predisposition because it is within that time period that an
accused may exhibit manifestations of his propensity for a
specific crime which might not appear were it not for the
State's initial enlistment of the defendant's participation.
Thus, we hold that the point of reference for ascertaining the predisposition of a defendant to commit a particular
crime is the time period extending from just before the
State's solicitation to just before the defendant's commission
of the crime. 148
B.

Evidence of Predisposition: The Many Forms

The government can offer a variety of types of evidence and testimony to demonstrate predisposition on the part of the defendant. The
types most commonly offered will be discussed below.
1. Defendant's Conduct in Response to Inducement. -It has been
said repeatedly in the entrapment area that perhaps the most revealing
evidence of the defendant's state of mind is the manner in which he
responds to the government inducement. A North Carolina court
stated: "Predisposition may be shown by a defendant's ready compliance, acquiescence in, or willingness to cooperate in the criminal plan
where the police merely afford the defendant an opportunity to commit the crime.'' 149 A few courts have stated the matter somewhat differently. The Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Andrews 150 noted
that the defendant may prevail by showing "that he had not favorably
received the government plan, and the government had had to 'push it'
on him, . . . or that several attempts at setting up an illicit deal had
failed and on at least one occasion he had directly refused to participate.''lSl The reasonable question, as still another court pointed out,

is whether "the defendant expressed reluctance to commit the offense
147. Id. (quoting Jannotti, 501 F. Supp. at 1191).
148. Harrison, 442 A.2d at 1386. See United States v. Khubani, 791 F.2d 260, 264-65 (2d
Cir. 1986). See also United States v. North, 746 F.2d 627, 630 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105
S. Ct. 1773 (1985).
149. State v. Hageman, 307 N.C. 1, 31,296 S.E.2d 433,450 (1982). See also United States v.
Meyers, 21 M.J. 1007, 1014 (A.C.M.R. 1986).
150. 765 F.2d 1491 (lith Cir. 1985).
151. Id. at 1499 (citations omitted).
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which was overcome only by repeated government inducement or per-

suasion ...." 152
In a large number of entrapment cases there is only a showing of
slight reluctance on the part of the defendant; therefore, the jury easily
concludes that the entrapment defense has not been made. One illustrative case is United States v. Hunt 153 in which the defendant was a
judge who was charged with accepting a pay-off. The facts demonstrated that once the pay-off proposal was clarified to the judge, "no
significant pressure or cajoling was required to secure the judge's assent."154 Indeed, the evidence showed no real reluctance on the part
of the judge: "[T]here was nothing to prevent him from breaking off
relations at that point, yet he chose to proceed along the path to corruption."155 The evidence also showed that after the initial contact
the defendant never demonstrated any desire to step back from the
criminal activity, at least not until his name had been disclosed to the
public. 156
Probably the most common case involving limited reluctance of
the defendant in entrapment matters arises in drug prosecutions. A
few cases are especially illustrative. In United States v. Perez-Leon 157
the defendant, in response to an inquiry for a drug sale by the government, initially indicated that he would not become involved. The testimony demonstrated, however, that the reason for this "reluctance"
was not a lack of interest in the transaction, but rather the nature of
the defendant's own prior drug dealing experience. 158 The defendant
later asked the government agent to leave his phone number and soon
thereafter the defendant urged the government agent to continue the
transaction. He demonstrated his knowledge and sophistication in the
drug business by pointing out specifics with respect to prices, asking
for a sample, and bragging that he was well known in the business.

The defendant subsequently provided a large quantity of cocaine
"within a few weeks time." 159 The court had little difficulty conclud-

152. United States v. Perez-Leon, 757 F.2d 866, 871 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 99
(1985). But see People v. Boalbey, 143 Ill. App. 3d 362, 493 N.E.2d 369 (1969) where the court
held that lack of reluctance was not enough. The government had to offer additional evidence as
to predisposition.
153. 749 F.2d 1078 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3479 (1985).
154. Id. at 1086.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. 757 F.2d 866 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 99 (1985).
158. The defendant's reluctance was explained by his comment, "I've been burned before."
Id. at 872.
159. Id.
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ing that predisposition had been shown although the defendant initially had "expressed slight hesitation." The court stated that this

hesitation was not sufficient to refute predisposition:
[It] may have been caused by the very nature of drug transactions in that a new buyer is usually checked and crosschecked to the best of his supplier's ability. "Drug dealers
are not known to call potential clients and solicit their business, rather a dealer who expects to stay out of jail is careful
about to whom he sells." 160
The defendant in State v. Duncan 161 had obtained cocaine for an
undercover government officer on numerous occasions with speed and
efficiency. The fact that there was no delay or hesitation on the defendant's part was a major reason for the affirmation of his
conviction. 162
A showing of general reluctance will constitute powerful proof of
an unpredisposed mind, and the government under such circumstances will experience difficulty in prevailing on the predisposition issue. Such circumstances are found in United States v. Knight. 163 The
defendant in Knight was convicted of transferring a "sawed-off" shotgun. 164 The testimony revealed that the defendant was willing to sell a
shotgun with a legal barrel length to the government agent. The
agent, however, claimed that he would purchase the gun only if the
barrel were "sawed-off." Defendant clearly indicated reluctance to
sell such a weapon. This reluctance, however, was "overcome by repeated Government inducements and the Defendant's precarious financial condition. Furthermore, the evidence also revealed that the
Defendant did not cut the barrel until repeated Government importuning overcame his reluctance to do so." 165 After reviewing this evidence, the trial court held that reasonable doubt existed as to

predisposition and found the defendant innocent of the charges.
2. The Defendant's Ability to Perform the Illegal Acts.-The ideal
hypothetical case for defense counsel is one in which government
agents first contact the defendant and ask him to sell them illegal narcotics for a very high price. The defendant agrees to do so and then
spends a great deal of time contacting numerous individuals before he
is able to find his supplier. The sale to the government agent is then
160. ld. (quoting United States v. Gunter, 741 F.2d 151, 154 (7th Cir. 1984)).
161. 75 N.C. App. 38, 330 S.E.2d 481 (1985).
162. Id. at 44, 330 S.E.2d at 487. See also United States v. Busby, 780 F.2d 804, 808 (9th
Cir. 1986); Fleishman, 684 F.2d at 1343.
163. 604 F. Supp. 984 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
164. In violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861 (d), (e) and § 5871 (Supp. III 1985).
165. 604 F. Supp. at 987.
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finalized after a fair amount of time, and the defendant is arrested.
This sequence of events may well demonstrate that the defendant was
not predisposed to commit the crime; instead, the idea for the crime
was implanted in his mind by government inducement. Considering
the time lags and the defendant's inability to perform the illegal act
quickly, the jury may well find that no predisposition has been shown.
Unfortunately for defense counsel, however, most cases that raise the
issue involve precisely the opposite fact pattern, one in which the defendant is ready, willing and quite able to perform the illegal act on
relatively short notice.
The well-known case of United States v. Gunter 166 is one of the
numerous cases on this issue. The defendants in Gunter were convicted of various narcotics offenses. Within a relatively short period of

time after having been contacted by government agents the defendants
arrived at the apartment of one of the agents with a large quantity of
cocaine. The defendants' ability to deliver this quantity of drugs without any apparent difficulty was strong evidence on the issue of
predisposition:
Properly viewed, the evidence was sufficient to prove defendants' predisposition. Defendants were able to acquire large
quantities of cocaine on short notice and exhibited no reluctance in selling the drug to [the police agent]. Defendants'
ability to obtain ~he drug provided sufficient basis for the
jury to infer that defendants were well versed in the drug
trade. 167
Indeed, the evidence in Gunter was made even more persuasive by the
defendants' ability to obtain more cocaine than necessary for the police agent, leading to the inference that the agent was not the defendants' only customer. As noted by the court, such actions are hardly
those of "unwary innocents induced by the Government into selling
drugs. Rather, defendants were ready and willing to sell cocaine and
did so repeatedly." 168
3. The Defendant's Prior Background.-Focusing on the criminal
background of the defendant is one of the standard methods of demonstrating predisposition. This form of proof is rarely challenged. The
underlying notion has always been that one who has committed the
166. 741 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1984).
167. Id. at 154.
168. Id. See also Perez-Leon, 757 F.2d at 872 n.5, where the court found the evidence to be
even more compelling than in Gunter. In the Gunter case the transactions took about two

months. In Perez-Leon, the transaction took place less than two weeks later and the defendants
supplied two kilograms of cocaine, or approximately 180 times the amount supplied by the defendant in Gunter. See also Busby, 780 F.2d at 808.
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criminal act before is more likely to be disposed to do so again. This
notion comes dangerously close to the forbidden rule that prior crimes
cannot be used to show "criminal propensity." Yet, the key issue in
an entrapment case is precisely whether the accused, at the time of the
government inducement, had a propensity to commit crimes of the
nature charged; that is, whether he was predisposed to do so. 169 As
one military court stated in a drug case, "Persons who possess and use
a controlled substance are logically more likely to have considered distributing it than someone who has no familiarity with drugs.'mo
Many serious problems arise from the use of prior acts of the
defendant to prove his state of mind. The first relates to the need to
distinguish between prior acts as opposed to prior crimes. The former

involves far more dangerous possibilities than the latter. Perhaps the
most extreme case of the government attempting to use prior unproved crimes to demonstrate state of mind occurred in State v.
Jones. 111 The defendant in Jones was convicted of various drug offenses. He claimed that he was entrapped by the government. The
trial judge allowed the State to introduce evidence that the defendant
had been indicted for delivering cocaine on another occasion. Indeed,
the prosecutor questioned the defendant about this nineteen-month
old indictment at some length. The appellate court strongly condemned this practice and noted that the evidence of the indictment
"was probative of nothing more than official suspicion of Jones's
wrongdoing." 172 The defendant's conviction was vacated because it
was very likely that the evidence of the prior indictment had seriously
prejudiced the jury.
The more common approach regarding prior acts of the defendant is to focus on prior convictions of the defendant for similar offenses. The argument is that these prior convictions show a
predisposition on the part of the defendant to commit the crime in
question; therefore, any claim of entrapment is defeated. The issue
arises in the federal courts most often under rule 404(b) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. 173 Rule 404(b) provides:
169. United States v. Burkley, 591 F.2d 903, 922 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 966
(1978).

170. United States v. Bailey, 21 M.J. 244, 246 n.3 (C.M.A.), mandale issued, 22 M.J. 21
(1986).
171. 416 A.2d 676 (R.I. 1980).
172. /d. at 683.
173. Admission of evidence under Rule 404(b) must also satisfy Rule 403 dealing with prejudice to the defendant. The trial judge must determine that the probative value outweighs the
potential for prejudice. In entrapment cases, however, the defense argument is somewhat prob·
lematic as "the defendant cannot claim he is prejudiced by evidence indicating that at the rele-
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Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to
prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident.
Though rule 404(b) does not refer explicitly to predisposition and
entrapment, it is obviously a rule of inclusion rather than exclusion;
only the use of such evidence to show propensity is prohibited, while
other uses are not. Perhaps the leading decision on application of the
Rule in the entrapment area is United States v. Burkley. 114 In that
case Judge McGowan carefully explained that evidence of other
crimes was not offered to show that the defendant acted in conformity
with those crimes, "but that he was disposed to act in this manner." 175
The defendant had not been entrapped because he had the necessary
predisposition. In a case such as Burkley there is little difficulty in
demonstrating proper admissibility of evidence of other crimes under
rule 404(b). The other crimes previously committed by the defendant
in Burkley related to large sales of narcotics, and the defendant was
presently charged with selling narcotics. Moreover, the period of time
between the two crimes was relatively short; it was only a matter of
months. 176
The real question in determining the applicability of rule 404(b)
in the entrapment area is whether the prior crimes are truly relevant to
proving the predisposition of the defendant with respect to the present
crime. As stated in a nonentrapment matter, "[w]here the evidence
sought to be introduced is an extrinsic offense, its relevance is a function of its similarity to the offense charged." 177 In many prosecutions
where entrapment concerns arise the crimes are truly of a similar nature and few problems arise. The most common example is the case in
which the defendant charged with the sale of drugs has prior convictions for the purchase or sale of drugs. The problem is more acute in
other types of cases.
In United States v. Blankenship 178 the defendant was found guilty
of unlawfully dealing in firearms. His only defense claim was one of
vant time he had a propensity to commit crimes such as those he is accused of committing."
Burkley, 591 F.2d at 922.
174. 591 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 966 (1978).
175. Id. at 921 (emphasis in original).
176. Though in Burkley the "other" crime was a subsequent offense, not a prior one. Id.
177. United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 911 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920
(1978).
178. 775 F.2d 735 (6th Cir. 1985).
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entrapment. At trial, tape recordings were offered in which the defendant stated that he had also purchased stolen lawn equipment and
lumber. The court began its inquiry by noting that the other criminal
acts must "deal with conduct substantially similar and reasonably near

in time to the offenses for which the defendant is being tried." 179 The
court conceded that the use of such other offenses "is a reliable
method of proving the criminal predisposition needed to rebut the allegation or inference of entrapment." 180 The ultimate question, however, is whether these other crimes were "substantially similar to the
offenses charged." 181 The court decided that the other offenses, theft
of property offenses, were not substantially similar to the crime of unlawful dealing in firearms and that they merely demonstrated the defendant's general criminal character:
Proof that the defendant has committed thefts in the past
and is willing to share in the proceeds of a projected burglary
has little if any probative value with respect to the issue of
his predisposition to receive, possess, or deal in firearms. On
the other hand, this evidence is fraught with danger of undue
prejudice. Thus it fails both tests for the admissibility of
other crimes evidence. 182
A similar result was reached in State v. Burciaga 183 where the
defendant was charged with attempted trafficking in stolen property.
The State announced its intention to offer in evidence the defendant's
prior conviction for theft in order to rebut the defense of entrapment.184 The court began its analysis by repeating the limitation that
the past conduct "must be of a sufficiently similar nature to the crime
charged to show a predisposition to commit that crime." 185 It stated
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that theft was
not similar enough to trafficking in stolen property to demonstrate a

predisposition.
4. Other Evidence. -In most entrapment cases the predisposition
question can be resolved by looking either to prior acts of the defend179. /d. at 739. The court also considered, and gave some weight to, the defense's argument
that under Rule 403 the probative value was outweighed by the prejudice inherent in the admission of the evidence.
180. /d. (quoting United States v. Salisbury, 662 F.2d 738, 741 (11th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
457 u.s. 1107 (1982)).
181. /d.
182. /d. at 740.
183. 146 Ariz. 333, 705 P.2d 1384 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985).
184. Unlike some states, Arizona allows the entrapment matter (or at least the evidence regarding entrapment) to be offered and resolved pretrial in the form of a motion in limine. /d. at
334, 705 P.2d at 1385.
185. /d. at 1386-87 (emphasis in original).
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ant, typically crimes, or to the manner in which the defendant responded to the government inducement. In some cases, however, such
evidence is not dispositive and other forms of evidence are offered.
C.

Hearsay

Predisposition analysis focuses primarily on the defendant and
her personal background to determine "where [s]he sits on the continuum between naive first offender and the street-wise habitue.":86 By
sharpening this focus in entrapment cases, the courts have necessarily
paid close attention to this individual and her activities prior to the
contact by the government. Hence, it should not be surprising that in

numerous cases statements are found to the effect that "[e]vidence of
the defendant's reputation bears upon the [predisposition] issue." 187
Indeed, in some cases it is the defendant who may use this reputation
testimony to her advantage. For example, the court in Shrader v.
State 188 went well beyond usual entrapment law and held: "When the
police target a specific individual for an undercover operation, they
must have reasonable cause to believe that the individual is predisposed to commit the crime." 189 Thus, two separate questions are involved: (1) was there evidence of predisposition; and (2) did the
government have reasonable cause to believe that the defendant possessed such predisposition. In Shrader the defendant argued that even
though he had a reputation for having used drugs in the past, he had
no previous criminal record and he had no reputation with respect to
having sold narcotics in the past.. Consequently, the court held that
the defendant had been entrapped as a matter of law. 190
However, in most cases where reputation evidence is offered it is
offered to bolster the government's claim that the defendant had the
predisposition to commit the crime at the time the contact was made
with him. Evidence regarding the defendant's reputation usually falls
in one of three categories: (1) statements made by an informant to a
police officer about the defendant's general reputation for being a
criminal; (2) statements made to a police officer about specific criminal
186.
(1977).
187.
188.
189.
190.

United States v. Townsend, 555 F.2d 152, 155 n.3 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 897
State v. Jones, 598 S.W.2d 209, 220 (Tenn. 1980).
101 Nev. 499, 706 P.2d 834 (1985).
/d. at 502, 706 P.2d at 836.
/d. at 502, 504, 706 P.2d at 837, 839.
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activities of the defendant; and (3) statements made by various sources
about the defendant and recorded in police reports. 191
When offered in evidence, such statements are hearsay because
they are being offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, the
matter asserted being that the defendant was predisposed. 192 The federal courts vigilantly restricted the use of such hearsay statements to
prove general reputation or specific instances of misconduct by the
defendant. 193 Perhaps the leading opinion on this issue is United
States v. Webster, 194 decided by the Fifth Circuit en bane. In rebuttal,
the prosecution offered the testimony of a government agent that he
had been told by an informant that the defendant had sold the informant illegal narcotics on several prior occasions. The government argued, among other points, that the evidence should be admissible
because it directly refuted the defendant's claim that he lacked predisposition. The court found that such hearsay was extremely prejudicial
to the defendant and of little value to the trier of fact.
Our creation of a rule that allows gross hearsay evidence to be used to prove predisposition has resulted in the
very evils that the rule against hearsay was designed to prevent. The jury is free to believe the unsworn, unverified
statements of government informants, sometimes unidentified, whose credibility is not subject to effective testing before
the jury and whose motivations may be less than honorable.
We are hard pressed to envision a situation where the disparity between the probative value and the prejudicial effect of
evidence is greater. Finding inapplicable the exceptions to
the rule against hearsay enumerated in the Federal Rules of
Evidence, we hold that hearsay evidence is never admissible
for the purpose of proving the defendant's predisposition. 195
Hearsay statements constituting evidence of reputation may be
admissible in limited situations, even in federal courts where such evi191. These categories are taken from the United States v. Webster, 649 F.2d 346, 350 (5th
Cir. 1981).
192. The government has argued in some of these cases that the evidence of the defendant's
reputation is not hearsay, being admissible to show "a pertinent trait of his character" under
FED. R. EvlD. 404(a)(1). The courts have rather consistently rejected this position, finding that
predisposition "is a state of mind, not a character trait." Webster, 649 F.2d at 350.
193. Prior crimes which are offered under FED. R. Evm. 404(b) may be admitted for purposes other than proof of predisposition.
194. 649 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1981).
195. /d. at 350 (footnotes omitted). See also Hunt, 749 F.2d at 1082 and the numerous other
cases cited therein. The state cases, too, generally restrict hearsay. See, e.g., State v. Cox, 110
Ariz. 603, 522 P.2d 29 (1974); Price v. State, 397 N.E.2d 1043, 1045-46 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979);
Bowser v. State, 50 Md. App. 363, 439 A.2d 1 (1981). But see United States v. Hawke, 505 F.2d
817, 821-22 (lOth Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 978 (1975).
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dence is rejected in the "run-of-the-mill entrapment case." 196 The
cases which raise the issue are ones in which the defendant argues that
wholly apart from the subjective standard, the governmental misconduct has been so egregious that the claim against him should be dismissed. As noted by the dissenters in Webster, the defendant's
argument that the inducements of the government were too strong to
resist was "an attacking defense that puts the prosecution on trial." 197
Since it is "on trial," the government can respond to these attacks by
discussing the defendant's reputation:
Since the accused's attack, as here, necessarily impugns both
the methods employed by the government and its motives
and actions-implicating innocents in contrived crimes-the
government often seeks to show that the accused was not an
innocent at all. And since its motives and tactics are attacked as well, it offers proof that its belief in the accused's
predisposition was a reasonable one.... Necessarily, such a
response will often rest in large part on hearsay: the reports
on which the government acted in deciding to provide the
opportunity. 198
While this position did not prevail in Webster, 199 it did persuade
the court in United States v. Hunt.Z 00 Prior to trial the defendant in
Hunt moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground of "outrageous
government investigative conduct" that violated his due process
rights. Part of this argument was based upon the claim that the government had "no evidence of the defendant's illegal conduct other
than initiated by its own operatives."201 The court held that government testimony regarding the defendant's reputation was proper in response to the claim that the defendant had previously made. The
court conceded that this evidence could not have been offered had the
question of the government's basis for the investigation not been raised
by the defense:
It is evident that the defense simultaneously sought to develop both its entrapment and due process claims, which are
analytically distinct though relying to some extent on the
196. This is the court's language in Webster, 649 F.2d at 351.
197. Id. at 353 (Gee, J., dissenting).
198. Id. (footnote omitted).
199. The majority in Webster did allow such evidence to be offered, but in a much narrower
context than would have been allowed either by the majority in Hunt or by the dissenters in
Webster. The court indicated that "governmental good faith, motive, and reasonableness" would
be at issue in entrapment cases under the objective standard, but only in "rare circumstances."
649 F.2d at 351.
200. 749 F.2d 1078 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. deni'ed, 105 S. Ct. 3479 (1985).
201. Id. at 1083.

87

AM.

J. CRIM.

Vol. 14:53 (1987)

LAW

same facts. Though only the entrapment claim was for the
jury to resolve, the government was nevertheless entitled to
develop its rebuttal to the due process theory as well, once
the defense called the government's conduct into question.
Having "opened the door" the defendant may not be heard
to complain of testimony which proved adverse to his position that the government had no reason to investigate him. 202

D.

Expert Testimony

The question of expert testimony in entrapment cases rarely
arises. In advancing an entrapment defense, the defendant in State v.
Woods 203 made a pretrial motion for permission to introduce psychiatric testimony as to traits which were relevant to the predisposition
element of entrapment. 204 Although the matter was complicated
somewhat by the fact that Ohio does not recognize the claim of diminished capacity, the court nevertheless allowed the testimony to be admitted. The opinion noted that Ohio had adopted the subjective test
of entrapment as an affirmative defense. 205 The court concluded that
expert psychiatric testimony as to the defendant's "susceptibility to
influence may be relevant to an entrapment defense and an expert's
opinion on the susceptibility issue may aid the jury in its determination of critical issues of inducement and predisposition ...." 206 Because the basic issue in entrapment deals with the "origin of the
criminal intent," testimony concerning the defendant's susceptibility
to inducement was an important factor which should be viewed by the
trier of fact. 207 The major restriction the court placed on this testimony208 was that the expert could not testify concerning "the actions
of the government agents or their effect upon the defendant's susceptibility nor as to the ultimate issue of the existence of entrapment," all
of which was viewed as invading the province of the jury. 209
202. /d. at 1084.
203. 20 Ohio Misc. 2d 1, 484 N.E.2d 773 (Ct. C.P. 1984).
204. 484 N.E.2d at 774.
205. The court stated the Ohio subjective test as follows:
Where the criminal design for an offense originates with government agents and an
implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the act and induce
its commission, the defendant has been entrapped; likewise, there is no entrapment
when an agent merely affords the opportunity for the offense and the accused had a
predisposition to commit the offense.
/d.

206. /d.
207. /d. at 775.
208. Following the principle of the Third Circuit in United States v. Hill, 655 F.2d 512 (3d
Cir. 1981).
209. 484 N.E.2d at 775.
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E.

Subsequent Acts

The evidence in cases raising the predisposition issue usually focuses on conduct of the defendant prior to the government contact, or
conduct of the defendant that occurs simultaneously with the contact
and in response to it. In some cases, however, acts or statements of
the defendant after the initial contact by the government may be relevant to show predisposition. The courts have consistently admitted
such evidence of "post-crime actions." 210 The real issue in these cases
is whether these subsequent acts are relevant to the question of predisposition. The relevance issue with respect to subsequent acts is more
difficult than it is with prior acts because the focus is on the predisposition of the defendant, as opposed to the state of mind which may develop after the government takes the challenged actions. Nevertheless,
there are cases in which such later conduct may well be relevant. The
two most famous cases in the area demonstrate different fact patterns
in which similar principles were applied.
United States v. Jannotti 211 was one of the famous Abscam cases.
One aspect of the case involved the defendant Criden, a Philadelphia
attorney who allegedly gave money to Schwartz, the president of the
Philadelphia City Council, in return for Schwartz's introducing him to
Iannotti, the majority leader of the City Council. Payment of money
to this fund, a "finders fee," 212 was made after it had been put forth by
the government agents. The court held that the acceptance of this
payment could be considered by the jury on the question of predisposition, even though it occurred after the initial contact of the government, because it would tend to "demonstrate that he was disposed to
wrongdoing." 213 Similarly, in United States v. Jenkins, 214 a case involving the distribution of heroin, the court admitted evidence of a
subsequent act on the issue of predisposition. The defendant claimed
that he was an unwary and innocent person who had been entrapped
by the government into committing the narcotics offense. The defendant had no prior conviction, there was no evidence that he had a reputation as a dealer in narcotics, and there was no evidence that he had
made any prior sales. Nevertheless, willingness to engage in criminal
210.
Meyers,
1982).
211.
212.
213.
214.

See, e.g., United States v. Roland, 748 F.2d 1321, 1327 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v.
21 M.J. 1007, 1015 (A.C.M.R. 1986); Harrison v. State, 442 A.2d 1377, 1386 n.8 (Del.
673 F.2d 578 (3d Cir. 1982).
These are the words of the court. Id. at 605.
Id.
480 F.2d 1198 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 913 (1973).
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conduct was demonstrated by a statement he made after the sale: "[l]f
you need more, I'll be here." 215
As both of these cases demonstrate, subsequent actions and statements may be relevant on the issue of predisposition and, under such
circumstances, the evidence is properly admissible. However, the central entrapment issue does not change: "[P]redisposition refers to the
state of a mind of a defendant before government agents make any
suggestion that he should commit a crime."216 The determinative
question on the admissibility of evidence of subsequent acts and statements will be whether the evidence helps the jury in assessing the defendant's prior state of mind regarding particular criminal activity. 217
IV.

THE PRINCIPLES APPLIED

The preceding sections of this Article have focused upon the general principles used in determining predisposition. In this final section, these principles will be applied so as to offer some idea of the way
in which prosecutions are actually resolved on this issue.

A.

Where Predisposition Is Shown

"The defense of entrapment focuses upon whether the Government's actions implanted the criminal design in the mind of an otherwise unpredisposed person." 218 In many cases there is little doubt that
the totality of the evidence presented by the state shows predisposition
to the satisfaction of all. Some illustrative cases are those in which the
defendant eagerly, and with little reluctance, participates in the criminal venture. As stated earlier, the defendant in United States v. Perez-

Leon/19 was convicted for various narcotics offenses despite his claim
that he was not predisposed. The appellate court noted that the defendant's initial "reluctance" had little to do with predisposition. Instead, this reluctance was due to his prior bad drug dealing experience
as reflected in the defendant's comment, "I've been burned before. " 220
The defendant asked the government agent to leave his phone number,
and then urged the government agent to go forward with the drug
215. /d. at 1200.
216. United States v. Williams, 705 F.2d 603, 618 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1007
(1983).
217. See generally United States v. Silvestri, 719 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1983) (yet another Abscam case).
218. United States v. Thoma, 726 F.2d 1191, 1196 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, lOS S. Ct. 438
(1984).
219. 757 F.2d 866 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 99 (1985).
220. /d. at 872.
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transaction. The defendant further demonstrated sophistication and
knowledge of the drug business by offering opinions as to prices for
narcotics. Additionally, the defendant was able to come forward with
a large quantity of illegal drugs within a very short period of time. In
short, the defendant was no "naive person exploited by the government .... [Defendant] expressed slight hesitation, which may have
been caused by the very nature of drug transactions in that a new
buyer is usually checked and cross-checked to the best of his supplier's
ability." 221
The predisposition of the defendant may also be shown when the
defendant's conduct throughout a series of events is consistent over a
period of time. Government agents approached the defendant in Harrison v. State 222 to engage her participation in the sale and delivery of
drugs. Over a period of time the defendant was twice given the opportunity to withdraw from the arrangement; however, she had grown
more relaxed with the situation during this time and ultimately smuggled the drugs. 223 The defendant in Schneider v. Commonwealth 224
was convicted of distributing narcotics. The evidence at trial demonstrated that the defendant was a heavy marijuana user and expected to
receive some marijuana as compensation for his participation in the
transaction. During the course of the transaction he made three separate trips to arrange the sale and assisted in weighing the marijuana
and counting the money. 225
Predisposition may also be demonstrated where the defendant not
only expresses no reluctance toward participating in the transaction,

but actually expresses eagerness and actively pursues the government
agents involved in the transaction. In State v. Arnold 226 the government agent was not able to find the defendant at home for a third
meeting regarding a narcotics deal. At that point "defendant ... sin221. /d.
222. 442 A.2d 1377 (Del. 1982) (en bane).
223. The court in Harrison did express real concern over the extent to which the police
officers had involved themselves in manufacturing the offense. The court found, however, that
the statute providing the defense of entrapment was clear, and that the jury had had ample
evidence to decide the inducement issue. /d. at 1388. One judge, in dissent, went beyond expressing concern with respect to the state of law on this point:
I confess shock at the absence of a clear federal constitutional restriction on the
material inducement that a law enforcement officer or his agent can offer to another to
get the other to commit a crime. While some of the same considerations are present,
the question of a constitutional restriction is necessarily entirely separate from any legislative or common law intent as to the defense of entrapment.
/d. (Quillen, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
224. 337 S.E.2d 735 (Va. 1985).
225. /d. at 737.
226. 676 S.W.2d 61 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
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gly pursued [the agent] to consummate the sale and ... produced a
portable scale to demonstrate the accuracy of the weight of his
commodity. " 227
Perhaps the most striking recent case in which many of the above
elements were present is United States v. Roland. 228 The defendant in
Roland was convicted of paying unlawful gratuities to agents of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service. 229 The court's somewhat detailed description of the facts demonstrates the way in which the prosecution can assimilate these various elements in showing
predisposition:
The evidence overwhelmingly established that Roland, an attorney at the time of the offenses, eagerly participated in a
scheme to pay money to I.N.S. agents who were cooperating
with the Government. Over the course of 10 months, Roland paid approximately $43,000 to the agents to obtain alien
registration documents for his clients. Though obviously
sensitive to the risk of apprehension ("none of us is wired
right?") and expressing concern about "[t]hat Abscam case,"
Roland was tape recorded on 65 occasions discussing and
making his illegal payments and eagerly planning for more of
them. Not surprisingly, the jury rejected his preposterous
defense that the payments were part of what he thought was
a lawful fee-sharing arrangement. Among the numerous
items of evidence refuting this claim was an episode at which
Roland showed the agents a newspaper article concerning a
lawyer who was paying bribes to I.N.S. agents and arranging
fictitious marriages in order to secure "green cards" for his
clients; as Roland told the agents whom he was paying, "It's
exactly what we're doing." He also told the agents to deny
receiving any payments from him if anyone ever asked any
questions. 230
B.

Where No Predisposition Is Shown

The burden of disproving entrapment can be a heavy one for the
government to meet in jurisdictions using the subjective test. Once the
defendant has offered sufficient evidence ofinducement, 231 the government must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
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Id. at 63.
748 F.2d 1321 (2d Cir. 1984).
In violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(f) (1982).
748 F.2d at 1323.
On the question of the sufficiency of evidence of inducement, see Marcus, supra note 2.
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predisposed to commit the offense. 232 There are many cases that
demonstrate the difficulty that the government has in meeting its burden with respect to the state of mind of the defendant. Some courts
focus on the defendant's resistance to the criminal endeavor as well as
other factors in finding no predisposition. In State v. Devine 233 the
defendant initially refused to engage in the proposed criminal activity
and for a while successfully resisted the inducements of the government agents. Additionally, there was no evidence that the defendant
had ever been involved in any prior narcotics transactions, or was even
generally "prone towards criminality."234 As a result, the court held
that the evidence showed no predisposition: "The defendant withstood the constant pressure until the offer became so attractive that he
was no longer able to resist.'ms The court in United States v.
Knight 236 reached a similar result. The defendant in Knight was con-

victed of possession of a "sawed-off" shotgun. The court could not
find predisposition beyond a reasonable doubt, given that the defendant was initially only willing to sell a shotgun with a legal barrel length
to the government agent. He was reluctant to saw the barrel off and
did so only after "repeated Government inducements and [consideration of] the Defendant's precarious financial condition.''237 The court
concluded there was simply no evidence of predisposition to commit
the offense.
In United States v. McLernon 238 the defendant had no prior criminal record relevant to the matter, he had previously served in the military and was honorably discharged, and he devoted himself to various
charitable activities. There was "absolutely no propensity for criminal
involvement prior to governmental inducement." 239 Moreover, the evidence was clear that the government agent initiated the unlawful activities and demonstrated to the defendant that his involvement would
be profitable; the defendant expressed considerable reluctance to participate in the drug transactions. The government agent "continually
232. United States v. Roland, 748 F.2d 1321, 1327 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Navarro,
737 F.2d 625, 635 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1020 (1984); State v. Burciaga, 146 Ariz. 333,
335, 705 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Jones, 598 S.W.2d 209, 220 (Tenn.
1980).
233. 554 S.W.2d 442 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
234. /d. at 449.
235. /d. See generally United States v. Meyers, 21 M.J. 1007 (A.C.M.R. 1986).
236. 604 F. Supp. 984 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
237. /d. at 987.
238. 746 F.2d 1098 (6th Cir. 1984).
239. /d. at 1I 12.
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increased the pressure until [the defendant] finally acquiesced in his
demands." 240
The defendant in United States v. Lard 241 reacted negatively to
numerous requests by the government and had no relevant prior criminal record. Yet he was ultimately convicted of transferring a pipe
bomb. The court strongly condemned the government action in the
case:
While law enforcement officials may use strategy, stealth,
and even deception to catch the "unwary criminal," they
may not arbitrarily select an otherwise law abiding person,
gain his confidence, and then proceed to beguile or lure him
to commit a crime he would not have otherwise attempted.
It is the government's duty to prevent crime, not to instigate
or create it.242
One of the strongest cases refuting the predisposition claim is
found in an unusual prosecution that involved the sale of protected

eagles. In United States v. Dion 243 the defendant was a Native American who lived in an isolated area of South Dakota on one of the
poorest Indian reservations. According to trial witnesses, "life [there]
is for many Indians, a mere question of simple survival."244 The facts
evidenced in the Dion case truly were egregious. The government
"sting" at issue existed over two years. 245 The defendant had never
killed a protected bird before, had never been involved in making or
selling protected bird crafts, and believed it was against his Native
American religious beliefs to shoot an eagle. Indeed, the government
agents referred to him not as a "street-wise criminal," but instead as a
"naive first offender." Moreover, the offer of a relatively substantial
sum of money weighed heavily against a showing of predisposition in
this case, even though poverty alone would normally not be sufficient:
However, in some cases, it may be that the unusual poverty of the defendant or other problems peculiar to the de240. I d. at 1113. The demands put forth in the McLemon case truly were unique as set out
in the opinion. The defendant was befriended by the government agent and became so close that
"they performed the Indian ritual of becoming 'blood brothers.'" The defendant introduced the
agent to his family stating, "Here's my blood brother; he's going to be one of the family; treat
him just like the family." I d. at 1113.
241. 734 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1984).
242. Id. at 1295.
243. 762 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 106 S. Ct. 2216 (1986).
244. Id. at 689.
245. The court in Dian noted that the Attorney General had recently formulated "Guide·
lines on FBI Undercover Operations" limiting the duration of undercover operations, at least
initially, to six months. The court went on to discuss the problems in extending these operations
over long periods of time. /d. at 686, n.9.

94

Proving Entrapment
fendant
must
be
considered
in
determining
predisposition.... In this case, the government agents came
upon an extremely impoverished Indian reservation in a desolate area of South Dakota where, according to some of the
witnesses at the trial below, life is for many Indians, a mere
question of simple survival. The risk for the government in
offering so much money to these individuals over a nearly
two-and-one-half year period was that many who would
never have shot a protected bird would be enticed into doing
so.246
V.

CONCLUSION

The majority subjective test for entrapment, in sharp contrast to
the minority objective test, 247 focuses primarily on the actions and
state of mind of the defendant, rather than on the actions of the government.248 This focus requires the courts to carefully scrutinize the
evidence as to both the inducement of the government and, more critically, the predisposition of the defendant. In many prosecutions the

most difficult problems arise with the attempts of the government to
prove the predisposition of the defendant. Various forms of proof are
used in showing this state of mind. Ultimately, however, the determinative question is often simply whether the defendant was disposed to
commit a criminal offense prior to government contact. Alas, the answer to this question is not so simple and is often clouded by criminal
records of the defendants, substantial government involvement, and
rather questionable evidence with respect to the defendant and his
criminal propensity or reputation.

246. Id. at 689·90.
247. The test was set out eloquently by Justice Frankfurter in his dissenting opinion in Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
248. In the objective test, the key inquiry is whether-in the abstract-the government's
involvement was too overreaching. Id. at 379-81. See Park, supra note 1.
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